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ABSTRACT 
 
We present an overlapping generations model in order to assess the quantitative effects of 
financial frictions on output depending on the type of loan contract. Financial frictions are one 
of the major obstacles of the business environment because firms cannot borrow all what 
they need. This fact creates a misallocation of resources what reduces TFP and consequently 
GDP. We show that the type of loan contract plays an important role in order to quantify the 
effects of financial frictions on TFP and per capita GDP. Recent literature has begun to 
distinguish between asset-based and those earnings-based loan contracts. The traditional 
literature used to consider only asset-based loan contracts. However, over the last years, 
empirical evidence shows the relevance of earnings-based loan contracts.  Asset-based 
borrowing constraints overstate the effects of misallocation due to financial frictions. But 
earnings increase with productivity, so when the earnings are pledgeable, the effects on TFP 
caused by financial frictions are lower than when only assets are pledgeable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Per capita income is the main indicator of wealth and well-being in countries. Differences 
in this indicator across countries are closely related to differences in living standards. Most of 
cross-country differences in per capita income are due to differences in Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), rather than differences in production factors (See, among others, Hall & Jones (1999), 
Caselli (2005)). Furthermore, most of these differences are due to misallocation of resources 
rather than differences in the level of technology (See Jones (2011)). Misallocation of resources 
can arise because of several distortions, such as: bad policies, financial frictions and, in general, 
distortions that affect different firms in a differently way. In this paper we consider that there are 
financial frictions in those economies in which contracts cannot be completely enforced. 
Furthermore, we are going to distinguish between asset-based and earnings-based borrowing 
constraints and their different impact on the misallocation of resources and hence on income per 
capita. 
 
Our objective is to quantify the effects of the financial frictions on TFP and per capita GDP 
under different scenarios. We distinguish between three type of loan contract: The first one is the 
one developed by Amaral & Quintin (2010), where either the assets and the earnings are 
pledgeable. The second one is the assets-based borrowing constraint. And the last type is the 
earnings-based borrowing constraint. In order to carry out our work, we develop an overlapping 
generations model model based on Amaral & Quintin (2010). For each of the three frameworks 
we introduce financial frictions via contractual enforcement to compare the results across the 
three scenarios. What we find that assets-based borrowing constraints distort more than 
earnings-based borrowing constraints. 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This section will review the literature of the effect of financial frictions on aggregate 
variables, such as: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and per capita GDP. This work is placed within 
the literature that focuses on the analysis of those factors that can explain cross-country 
differences in per capita GDP. On the one hand, Hall and Jones (1999) show that cross-country 
differences in TFP is the main cause explaining differences in per capita income between 
developed and developing countries. Caselli (2005) also shows that cross-country differences in 
per capita income are due to cross-country differences in TFP. On the other hand, there is a 
consensus that cross-country differences in TFP are due either to the technological gap or to 
differences in efficiency. 
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In recent years, a new literature is focusing on misallocation of resources as a factor 
causing cross-country differences in TFP. For an economy to produce at an optimal level, 
resources must be efficiently allocated at the microeconomic level, that is, at the firm’s level. The 
allocation will be efficient when the marginal product of each production factor is equalized across 
firms. However, there are a number of reasons why this does not take place and would generate 
the aforementioned, misallocation of resources, which would mean a reduction in TFP and 
therefore in per capita income. Specifically, weak institutions are associated with greater 
distortions. Among the distortions that have been considered in the literature, which generate 
misallocation of resources, are: financial frictions, public firms (some of them may be less efficient 
than private ones and yet use more factors of production), corruption, political instability, informal 
sector, competition, crime, excess bureaucracy. Hsieh & Klenow (2009) is one of the first papers 
that quantifies how misallocation of resources across firms and industries can explain the 
difference in TFP between the US, China and India. They consider distortions, through a tax 
(subsidy) which favour some firms (with good political connections) over others and financial 
frictions through a capital tax. Jones (2011) reviews the literature that analyses the misallocation 
of resources as one of the main causes of cross-country differences in TFP. 
 
Financial frictions are one of the causes of misallocation of resources, so an economy 
with a developed financial system will have fewer financial frictions, and therefore a higher TFP. 
Levine et al. (2000) show how a developed financial system corresponds with a high level of 
enforcement of loan contracts and causes positive economic growth. Amaral & Quintin (2010) 
carry out an analysis across countries, showing that there is a monotonous relationship between 
the parameter that captures the level of financial development (that is, the degree at which 
financial contracts can be enforced), the level of private credit over GDP and the per capita GDP 
of a country. Those countries with greater financial development increase their output by 
increasing the capital used in production and using it to its best use. Furthermore, following the 
model of Lucas (1978), Amaral and Quintin show how these financial frictions can generate a 
misallocation of talent. Bah & Fang (2015) use the World Bank Entreprise Survey (ESWB) 
database and show how for a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, financial limitations 
(along with other distortions) are one of the causes that generate misallocation of resources, 
causing a large difference in per capita income levels and TFP across countries2. Most recently, 
Ranasinghe & Restuccia (2018), using the same database (ESWB), study how crime and lack of 
access to finance are the two biggest obstacles to operating at the optimal level. Rajan & Zingales 
(1998) show that industries that require more external financing grow faster in more financially 
developed countries. Additionally, small establishments are more severely affected by poor 
financial development, and industries dominated by small firms for technological reasons grow 
faster in countries with greater financial development. 
 
 
2 Bah and Fang (2015) build a simple model based in Amaral et al. (2010). 
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These papers show the importance of the quality of financial institutions when contributing 
to the TFP. When we talk about financial frictions, traditional literature has considered asset-
based borrowing restrictions as the cornerstone. However, recent literature has begun to 
distinguish between two types of restrictions: asset-based (the traditional approach) and 
earnings-based borrowing constraints. Drechsel (2019), using US data, claims that US firms 
borrowing capacity not only depends on firms’ assets but also on their current earnings. This 
finding comes from the observed facts, which are compatible with the empirical implications that 
earnings-based borrowing constraints imply that the borrowing capacity expands in response to 
investment positive shocks, whereas an asset-based constraint implies the opposite3. Moreover 
Li (2016) shows for a large panel of firms in Japan that the borrowing capacity increases with 
productivity, that is, borrowing capacity depends not only on assets but also in earnings. 
Aggregate productivity loss due to financial frictions is also smaller if taking into account that 
borrowing capacity not only depends on assets but also on earnings. Chen & Ma (2019), for a 
panel firms of Japan and the US, find that only the 20% of the debt of non-financial US firms is 
based on assets, and that there are differences between both countries. They also point out that 
for the least financially developed countries, earnings-based loans are more complicated to take 
place. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The availability of comparable data at the microeconomic level across countries, 
quantifying variables such as the likelihood of vandalism, bribery of licenses, lack of electricity, 
infrastructure or access to finance has made it possible to analyse how differences across 
countries, in these factors, can explain differences in TFP or GDP per capita. One of the best 
databases is the Enterprise Survey of the World Bank (ESWB)4 which records factors that affect 
the firm’s business environment. The surveys cover a broad range of business environment topics 
including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and performance 
measures. Enterprise Surveys offers an expansive array of economic data on 164,000 firms in 
144 countries. According to ESWB, access to finance is one of the major obstacles of firms, 
especially for young and small firms. 
 
Access to finance is one of the 12 topics that this database records. This topic includes 
several indicators assessing credit sources, loan requirements, and access to financial services 
for 144 countries, and by country regions. These indicators provide us the possibility to analyse 
and observe the financial development of the countries and regions. Next table is going to show 
the different indicators of finance considered by ESWB, for each country group or geographic 
region: 
 
3 See Drechsel (2019) Appendix B for more information about earnings-based constraint.  
4 Available at https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
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TABLE 1 
Indicators of Finance by Regions of Countries 
 
 
Source: ESWB 
 
As we can observe in Table 1, in high income countries (OECD) 47.3% of the firms have 
a loan of credit with a bank, meanwhile in South Asia countries or Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
is less than 30%. Consequently, high income countries have higher Private Debt / GDP ratio than 
less developed countries, being consistent with the quantitative results of Amaral et al. (2010). 
Furthermore, the third column give us the proportion of loans requiring collateral, that is, 
percentage of loan based on assets. OECD countries are the one who require less collateral 
(57.8%), while Sub-Saharan Africa countries are who require the most collateral (84.3%). 
Therefore, the relevance of asset-based versus earnings-based borrowing constraints across 
countries is not the same. 
THE MODEL 
 
The model is the same as in Bah & Fang (2015), based on Amaral & Quintin (2010). The 
framework is a discrete-time overlapping generations model. Each period consists in 20 years 
and a mass one of heterogeneous individuals, that live two periods, is born. Over the first period, 
all individuals are workers and they supply their labour force inelastically. Over their second period 
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individuals must decide between remaining as workers or becoming entrepeneurs5. In order to 
carry out this distinction, all individuals are endowed with a particular managerial skill level 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 
which is constant along the individual’s lifetime and follows a distribution g(z) which is constant 
across generations.  
 
This occupational choice is based on Lucas (1978) where individuals decide to become 
in entrepreneurs if their expected value function as entrepreneurs is higher than their expected 
value function as workers. The work value function is constant along workers lifetime and 
independent of their level of managerial skill. However, entrepreneurs’ value function increases 
strictly with the level of managerial skill. So, individuals become entrepeneurs if their managerial 
skill level is above an ability threshold (for which the value function of worker and of entrepreneur 
cross each other). Then more productive individuals will become in managers.  
 
The model is analyzed at the steady state equilibrium for a closed economy with constant 
wage and interest rates. The interest rate is exogenously determined. The calibration will be done 
in order to ensure that savings are higher than capital demand, that is, the interest rate is not 
adjusted to guarantee that savings are equal to capital. The differences between savings and 
capital will be interpreted as the residential investment. In all our simulations this storage 
(residential investment) is higher than zero, as in Amaral et al (2010). Furthermore, since the 
economy is closed, the model does not allow individuals to go to international markets.  
 
THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
 
Individuals live for two periods. Individuals’ preferences are represented by the following 
utility function: 
𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = log(𝑐1) + 𝛽log⁡(𝑐2)6 
Where β denotes the subjective discount factor. In the first period, all individuals are 
workers and supply labour force inelastically. In the second period they must choose between 
remaining as workers or becoming a manager. 
 
 
 
 
5 Amaral et al. (2010) consider an overlapping generations model formed by three generations. 
The first two period are the same as in Bah & Fang (2015), and in the third periods all the 
individuals are retired. 
6 In the US log corresponds to the neperian logarithm. 
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THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
 
In the second period, each entrepreneur with an ability z combines inputs of labor l>0 and 
physical capital k>0 into a single consumption good producing according to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology with decreasing return to scale: 
𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑧) = 𝑦 = 𝑧[𝑘𝛼𝑙1−𝛼]𝛾 
Where  𝛼 ∈ (0,1)⁡and⁡𝛾 < 1 is the span of control parameter as in Lucas (1978), and is lower than 
one in order to firms have positive profits even when the markets are competitive7. We can rewrite 
the above function as follows: 
𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑧) = 𝑦 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 
Where θ =αγ is the capital share, μ =(1-α)γ is the labor share and θ + μ < 1. 
 
THE MARKET FOR LOANS 
 
Managers can self-finance part of their capital using savings from the first period of their 
lifetime 𝑎 ≥ 0. They also can finance their capital through external resources, that is, borrowing 
an amount 𝑑 ≥ 0  from an intermediary agent. This intermediary can borrow and lend at an 
exogenous gross rate 1+r. Intermediaries store resources from workers with exogenous net return 
r, and can lend to the entrepreneurs at that same rate. The production sector carried out by 
managers is the production activity, while savings channeled outside the production sector is the 
storage technology which can be interpreted as residential investment. This assumption is the 
same done by Amaral et al. (2010), because residential capital is linearly related to GDP8. 
 
The financial market is imperfect and the managers have the option to default on their 
debt liabilities with the intermediary agent. If a manager decides to defaults, he loses a fraction η 
>0 of his earnings and/or assets. This parameter records the quality of the financial institutions. 
Higher the quality of enforcement, higher the quality of financial institutions and higher the fraction 
lost. So, we can think in the parameter η as the degree of contractual enforcement.9 There is no 
uncertainty in the model and the financial intermediary behaves competitively. In equilibrium, 
intermediaries will impose a maximum debt limit such that managers find rational not to default. 
 
7 When 𝛾 = 1 we have constant return to scale, and only the most productive manager obtains 
positive profits. 
8 See Erosa (2001).  
9 In a developed country there clearly the parameter η would be high, because in case of default, 
the lender will have a court with high grants against the firm in order to recover his loan, Drechsel 
(2019). 
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So, there exist a level equal or higher than η at which the market of loan is perfect and then all 
firms produce at an optimal scale because the borrowing needs of all firms are lower than their 
debt limit. 
 
Managers select the solution where their own investment a is the highest, and if they can 
self-finance all their capital they do so, even though they could choose to borrow some of it10. As 
we have just said above, there exist a value of the parameter 𝜂 such that all the firms produce at 
an optimal scale. However, below that value, managers are constrained to operate at a 
suboptimal scale, unless their savings exceed a threshold 𝑎∗, then they could self-finance all their 
capital demand. Nonetheless, under that threshold 𝑎∗ the managers access to financial market, 
and this outside finance increases with the savings a or with the managerial skill z, depending of 
course on the type of lending contract. 
 
ENDOGENOUS DEBT LIMITS 
 
In this paper we consider three frameworks regarding the borrowing constraints. The first 
scenario is the Amaral & Quintin (2010) loan contract, which combines assets-based and 
earnings-based borrowing constraints. The second scenario is the assets-based borrowing 
constraint, the most familiar in the literature. Finally, the third scenario is the loan contract based 
on earnings as in Drechsel (2019). For the three scenarios, if 𝜂 = 0, the institutional quality is so 
weak that the cost of default is zero, and firms decide, rationally, do not pay their debt. In 
equilibrium there will not be lenders willing to lend and entrepreneurs will not be able to borrow. 
At the other extreme, if 𝜂 = 1; the institutional quality is very strong, and entrepreneurs lose 
everything if they default. In this case, there will not be any limit on their debt. So, if 𝜂 = 0 the 
amount of debt that entrepeneurs can borrow is zero, and if 𝜂 = 1  entrepreneurs are not 
restricted. 
 
Amaral & Quintin borrowing constraint 
 
Each entrepreneur with ability 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍  and savings a ≥0, faces the following incentive-
compatibility constraint: 
𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ (1 − 𝜂)[𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) + (𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟)] 
where 𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑑, and 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) denotes manager’s profits. 
This inequality states that it must be individually rational for the managers to repay their 
loan. The left hand side denotes entrepreneur’s income in their second period when they pay their 
 
10 In the “Appendix.2” section is shown why managers decide to invest all their savings in 
physical capital. 
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loan, that is, if the managers abide the contract they receive their profits 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) and the 
accrued value of their own investment, a(1+r). On other hand, on the right hand side 
entrepreneurs’ default and do not pay their loan, and they lose a fraction 𝜂 (which denotes the 
cost of default) of the resulting resources. That is, if the managers do not abide the contract 
fraction η of their profits, undepreciated capital and its return is lost.  
 
In order to obtain the entrepreneurs’ maximum debt limit, we solve the previous inequality in terms 
of d such that the managers choose not to default and repay the loan: 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝜂
(1 − 𝜂)(1 + 𝑟)
[⁡𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) ⁡+ 𝑎(1 + 𝑟)] 
 
(7) 
This constraint of the maximum debt limit states that managers with more savings and 
better productivity can borrow more from the financial market. So, managers with more savings 
can finance more capital with their own savings, and those with more savings can also borrow 
more too from financial market. Furthermore, debt limit depends positively on the parameter 𝜂, 
the contractual enforcement. If 𝜂 = 0, managers cannot borrow any amount. If 𝜂 = 1  managers 
are not restricted to borrow any positive amount. 
So, the profit maximization problem of a manager with ability z, savings a, and capital k=a+d is 
given by: 
 
max
{𝑙,𝑘}
⁡𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) ⁡= 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
s.t             𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1−𝜂)(1+𝑟)
[𝜋(𝑘, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) ⁡+ 𝑎(1 + 𝑟)] 
 
Assets-based borrowing constraint 
 
In this subsection we focus on the assets-based borrowing constraint framework. The 
lender has a legal claim on assets, and if the entrepreneur defaults, he loses a fraction 𝜂 of their 
assets.  The incentive-compatibility constraint of entrepreneurs of ability 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 with savings a ≥0 
is given by the following expression: 
𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧;𝑤, 𝑟) + (1 − 𝜂)(𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
where 𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) denotes manager’s profits, w the wage rate and r the interest 
rate. 
That inequality states that it must be individually rational for the managers to repay their 
loan. The left hand side denotes entrepreneur’s income in their second period when they pay their 
loan, that is, if the managers abide the contract they receive their profits 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) and the 
accrued value of their own investment, a(1+r), exactly the same as in the previous scenario. On 
 10 
 
other hand, on the right hand side entrepreneurs’ default, do not pay their loan and lose a fraction 
𝜂 (which denotes the cost of default) of their undepreciated capital and its return is lost.  
 
In order to obtain the entrepreneurs debt limit, we solve the previous inequality in terms of d such 
that the managers choose not to default and repay the loan: 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝜂
(1 − 𝜂)
𝑎 
 
(8) 
This constraint of the maximum debt limit states that managers with more savings can 
borrow more from the financial market. So, managers with more savings can finance more capital 
with their own savings, and those with more savings can also borrow more from financial market. 
Furthermore, debt limit depends positively on the parameter 𝜂, the contractual enforcement. In 
contrast with the previous scenario, now the debt limit only depends on savings and not in 
productivity too, what is going to have effects on our quantitative exercise.11 
 
So, the profits maximization problem of a manager with ability z, savings a, and capital k=a+d is 
given by: 
max
{𝑙,𝑘}
𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
s.t          𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1−𝜂)
𝑎 
 
Earnings-based borrowing constraint 
 
In the case of earnings-based constraint, the lender has a legal claim of the 
entrepreneur’s operational profits. In order to assess the operational profits, Drechsel (2019) use 
a fixed multiple of the term EBDITA12. We use the same method. So, each entrepreneur with 
ability 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 and savings a ≥0, faces the following incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC): 
 
𝜋𝑛(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ [(1 − 𝜂)𝜋𝑛(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] + (𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
where 𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑑, and 𝜋𝑛(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) = 𝑦 −𝑤𝑙 denotes manager’s EBITDA 
Therefore: 𝜋𝑛(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) ⁡− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 = 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟)⁡ 
That inequality states that it must be individually rational for the managers to repay their 
loan. The left hand side denotes entrepreneur’s income in their second period when they pay their 
 
11 In “Results” section we are going to show how when firms when they are constrained by assets-based 
borrowing constraint, the effect of financial frictions on aggregate TFP is higher than we consider 
earnings-based constraint, as in Li (2016). 
12 EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest Depreciation and Amortization 
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loan. That is, if managers abide the contract, they receive their profits 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) and the 
accrued value of their own investment, a(1+r), exactly the same as in the two previous scenarios. 
On other hand, on the right hand side, if entrepreneurs’ default and do not pay their loan, they 
lose a fraction 𝜂 (which denotes the cost of default) of their resulting operational profits (y-wl). 
 
In order to obtain the entrepreneurs’ maximum debt limit, we solve the previous ICC in terms of d 
such that the managers choose not to default and repay the loan: 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝜂
(1 + 𝑟)
𝜋𝑛 
 
(9) 
This constraint of debt limit states that managers with more productivity can borrow more 
from the financial market. Furthermore, indirectly managers with more savings can borrow more 
too because the profits depend positively on savings. So, managers with more savings can 
finance more capital with their own savings, and those with more savings can also borrow more 
too from financial market. As in the previous cases, the debt limit depends positively on the 
parameter 𝜂, the contractual enforcement. 
 
So, the profit maximization problem of a manager with ability z, savings a, and capital k=a+d is 
given by: 
max
{𝑙,𝑘}
⁡𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
s.t             𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1+𝑟)
⁡𝜋𝑛(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟) 
 
ENTREPNEURS’ PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 
For the three frameworks, the maximum debt limit of firms 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥  can be higher or lower 
than entrepreneurs’ borrowing needs. If they can self-finance all their capital they do so, even 
though they could choose to borrow some of it13.  If the borrowing needs are lower than the 
maximum debt limit, the firm will demand capital at an optimal scale, producing at an optimal 
scale. On the other hand, if the borrowing needs are higher than the debt limit, firms will demand 
capital below the optimal level, producing at a level below the optimal. Therefore, entrepreneurs 
can be unconstrained, and produce at their optimal scale, or they can be constrained and produce 
a lower level of production than the optimal. Consequently, entrepreneurs' profit maximization 
problem is solved in two steps. In the first step, it is obtained the optimal labor demand, for a given 
amount of capital. In the second step, the capital demanded is obtained (it can be the optimal one 
or lower than the optimal).  
 
13 In the “Appendix.2” section is shown why managers decide to invest all their savings in 
physical capital. 
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Then, the problem of profits maximization problem faced by a firm is: 
 
max
{𝑙,𝑘}
𝜋 = 𝑦 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
We solve this maximization problem in two stages, first we get the optimal labor force for a given 
capital demand and then we obtain the optimal capital: 
 
1) Optimal labour demand in terms of capital14. 
 
max
{𝑙}
𝜋 = 𝑦 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
s.t 𝑦 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 
 
Maximizing in terms of l we obtain the optimal expression of labour demand as a function of 
capital: 
 
𝑙∗ = [
𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃
𝑤
]
1
1−𝜇
 
 
(1) 
 
 
As we can observe labor demand depends negatively on wage rate, that is, the price of labor 
factor, and positively on entrepreneur’s managerial ability. Once we have obtained the optimal 
labor demand expression, we move to the second stage to get the expression of capital demand: 
2.a) The optimal capital demand when entrepreneurs are unconstrained 
 
max
{𝑘}
𝜋 = 𝑦 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
 
Maximizing in terms of k and using (1) we obtain the optimal expression of capital demand: 
 
 
14 The level of capital could be the optimal level or lower, depending on each firm borrowing needs 
and debt limit. 
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𝑘∗ = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Capital demand depends negatively on factor prices w, r and δ. Moreover, it depends positively 
on entrepreneur managerial ability15. Then, more productive firms demand more capital.  
 
2.b) Optimal capital demand for constrained entrepreneurs: k=a+𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥  
 
The expression for the output of a firm in terms of capital: 
 
𝑦 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 
 
𝑦 = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧𝑘𝜃]
1
1−𝜇
 
 
(3) 
 
For entrepreneurs unconstrained, output is negatively related to factor prices and positive related 
to managerial skill. Replacing (2) we obtain the optimal output expression: 
𝑦∗ = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
(4) 
Finally, we obtain the expression for profits in terms of capital: 
𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
Replacing (1): 
𝜋 = (1 − 𝜇) [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧𝑘𝜃]
1
1−𝜇
− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
 
(5) 
 
Expression (3) is the profits of a firm in terms of capital, which can be the optimal level or lower. 
For unconstrained entrepreneurs, profits are negatively related to factor prices and positive 
related to managerial skill. We use (2) to get the optimal expression of profits: 
 
15 Remember that θ + μ < 1 then 1- θ- μ >0  
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𝜋∗ = (1 − 𝜇 − 𝜃) [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
(6) 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD’S UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 
 
Individuals live for two periods. In the first one all individuals are workers and they supply 
their labour force inelastically. In their second period they must choose between remaining as 
workers or becoming a manager. We begin by solving the model for those individuals who decide 
to remain as workers in their second period. 
 
WORKERS  
 
Workers’ utility maximization problem is given by: 
 
max
{𝑐1⁡𝑐2}
𝑈 = log 𝑐1 + 𝛽 log 𝑐2 
s.t {
𝑐1 = 𝑤 − 𝑎
𝑐2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 +𝑤
𝑎 ≥ 0
 
 
We establish non-negativeness of savings as in Amaral et al. (2010). Maximizing in terms of c1 
and c2 we get: 
1) The interior solutions are characterized by the following expressions: 
𝑎𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤(𝛽(1 + 𝑟) − 1)
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
(7) 
 
 
𝑐1
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤(2 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
⁡⁡ 
 
(8) 
 
 
𝑐2
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤𝛽(2 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
(9) 
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2) The corner solutions are characterized by the following ones: 
 
𝑎𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 0; 𝑐1
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝑤;𝑐2
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝑤 
 
(10) 
 
ENTREPRENEURS 
 
Similarly, entrepreneurs solve the following utility maximization problem: 
 
max
{𝑐1⁡𝑐2}
𝑈 = log 𝑐1 + 𝛽 log 𝑐2 
s.t {
𝑐1 = 𝑤 − 𝑎
𝑐2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝜋
∗(𝑎, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟)
𝑎 ≥ 0
 
 
We establish non-negativeness of savings as in the workers’ case. Maximizing in terms of c1 
and c2 we get: 
1) The interior solutions are characterized by the following expressions: 
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠 ⁡=
𝑤𝛽(1 + 𝑟) − 𝜋
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
(11) 
 
 
𝑐1
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
=
𝑤(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡ 
 
(12) 
 
 
𝑐2
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
=
𝛽(𝑤(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
(13) 
 
 
1) The corner solutions are characterized by the following ones: 
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠 = 0, 𝑐1
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
= 𝑤, ⁡𝑐2
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
= 𝜋 
 
 
 
(14) 
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OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE 
 
In the second period individuals have an occupation choice. For a given level of 
contractual enforcement, wage and interest rate, 𝜋(𝑎 + 𝑑, 𝑧; 𝑤, 𝑟)  increases with z. It can be 
shown that there exists a unique ability threshold ?̅? at which individuals are indifferent between 
remaining as workers or becoming managers. If individuals are above the threshold, they become 
managers because the value function as entrepreneurs (which increases with z) is higher than 
the value function as worker16. Furthermore, it can also be shown that the level of k(z;⁡𝜂,w,r) is 
unique for each z, because for each z the managers select the solution where their own 
investment a is the highest, and then, the results for each z is going to be unique at that specific 
level z. 
PARAMETERIZATION 
 
In this section we are going to present the choice of the parameter values of the model. 
Some of the parameters are taken exogenously as given from other papers. Some other 
parameters will be calibrated. 
 
EXOGENOUS PARAMETERS 
 
Table 2 shows the parameters taken outside of the model, their values and the papers from where 
they have been taken: 
 
TABLE 2 
 
EXOGENOUS PARAMETERS 
 
Parameters Value Paper 
r 0.04 
1 
10 
100 
0.33 
0.05 
0.85 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Zmin 
Zmax 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Gridz 
α 
δ 
𝛾 
 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Amaral & Quintin (2010) 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Bah & Fang (2015) 
Source: Own elaboration. Notice that r and δ are annualized values. See more in the text below. 
 
 
16 Amaral et al. (2010), in Lemma 1 show in more detail the results of this occupational choice. 
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A period in the model correspond to 20 years. The values of the parameters δ and r are 
annualized. Parameter γ is the span-of-control, Lucas (1978), which in Bah & Fang is equal to 
0.85. With respect to parameter α, this determines the capital share. In our model, the share of 
capital is αγ which is equal to θ, and share of labor is equal to (1- α)γ which is the parameter μ. 
With respect to Zmin and Zmax, those parameters correspond to the minimum and the maximum 
value of the managerial skill, respectively. Gridz is the grid of the managerial ability. As in Bah & 
Fang (2015), we consider that there are 100 levels of managerial ability between 1 and 10, both 
included. 
 
PARAMETERS CALIBRATED 
 
The economy is calibrated according to two main features of the US economy, the 
employment distribution along the establishment size, and the distribution of the establishments. 
In order to replicate these features, we calibrate the mean and the standard deviation of the 
managerial ability. As in Bah & Fang (2015), we assume that managerial skill follows a lognormal 
distribution with mean m, standard deviation σ. Next figure shows how our model matches the 
data compared to the US data. Orange color correspond to the US data and blue color to the 
model. So, we can say that the calibration of m and σ is quite good.   
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Source: Own elaboration. The graph of the left-hand side shows the distribution of establishment 
by establishment size, that is, the most of the establishments have less than 20 workers. On the 
right-hand side we have the employment distribution along the establishment size. Big 
establishments (with more than 100 workers) are the establishments which employ more workers. 
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We calibrate the parameter β as in Amaral et al. (2010) to get a ratio of Storage/Savings 
close to 40%, as observed in the US economy in 1994. The annualized Value of β is equal to 
1.12317.  
 
TABLE 3 
PARAMETERS CALIBRATED 
 
Parameters  Value  
m 
σ 
β 
η 
 
 
-2.12 
0.382 
1.123 
0.7 (Amaral & Quintin) 
1 (Assets-based) 
0.79 (Earnings-based) 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
With respect to the parameter η, we compute to the minimum value at which all firms 
produce at an optimal scale. Then, we have three different values of η, each for each of the three 
scenarios. At these levels or above, all firms are producing at an optimal scale because they are 
not constrained. So, the results at the optimal level are the same for the three scenarios, 
independently of the type of borrowing constraint. In all equilibria, the amount of storage is 
positive, therefore savings are always higher than physical capital, S > K. 
RESULTS 
 
In this section we show the results of our quantitative exercise that have been computed 
using the Matlab software. We compare steady-state equilibria of different economies that differ 
on the type of loan contract and the quality of enforcement. For each scenario (type of loan 
contract), we decrease the quality enforcement (decreasing parameter η), starting from the case 
where all the firms produce at an optimal level. Then we compare the results along the three 
different frameworks. Firstly, we present our results at individual level, that is, at firm’s level. 
Secondly, we present the results at aggregate level. 
 
  
 
17 In an OLG model the parameter β can be higher than one. Nonetheless, in a dynastic model β 
must be lower than one in order to fulfill the transversality condition. 
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INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
The first distortion of the financial friction is the misallocation of capital. More productive 
managers (managers with high managerial skill) demand more capital than less productive 
managers. Consequently, the most productive managers are going to borrow more from the 
financial market under the absence of financial frictions. However, if the contractual enforcement 
is low (high financial frictions), the debt limit decreases and these high productive managers 
cannot get all the capital they need to operate at an optimal scale. In order to measure this first 
distortion, we use the Output/Capital ratio as a proxy variable of the marginal product of capital. 
The next figure shows the Output/Capital ratio, debt level, capital, distorted capital (difference 
between the optimal and the level of capital demanded) and output across managerial levels, 
when there are no distortions. 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Source: Own elaboration. X axis goes from 2.27 to 10 due to below 2.27 (ability threshold) 
individuals are workers and this figure records the results for managers. Then 2.27 is the ability 
threshold in the optimal case.  
 
Looking at the first graph of Figure 2, we can see that the Output/Capital ratio is the same 
across entrepreneurs when they are producing at their optimal level. That is, the marginal product 
of capital is equalized across firms, because the resources are efficiently allocated. When firms 
are operating at an optimal scale, the distortion in capital is zero for all managers (third graph), 
that is, the difference between the optimal capital and the capital demanded across all managerial 
levels is zero. Furthermore, the second graph of Figure 2 shows that debt increases across 
managerial skills, that is, as we have just said, outside financing increases with productivity 
because higher the ability of the entrepreneur, higher his/her capital demand (fourth graph of 
Figure 2), and then he/she requires more to borrow. Finally, output is higher as manager’s 
productivity increases, because these individuals manage more capital and use them to its best 
uses.  
 
Once we have analyzed the case when the financial frictions are zero, we are focus on 
the distortions generated from the financial frictions for each type of loan contract. 
 
AMARAL & QUINTIN BORROWING CONSTRAINTS  
 
In this scenario, all firms produce at an optimal level when η ≥ 0.7. As the value of η 
decreases, the financial frictions suffered by entrepreneur’s increase. Figure 3 shows the 
quantitative results for a value η=0.08 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In the first graph of Figure 3, we can observe that as the value of η decreases, less 
contracts become enforceable, and manager’s access to outside financing get worse. The 
marginal product of capital is not equalized across firms. The most skilled managers are more 
constrained than less skilled managers and then their level of capital is further from the optimal 
case. For this reason, the Output/Capital ratio for the most skilled entrepreneurs is higher. This 
misallocation of resources is one of the distortions that arises because of financial frictions. The 
output/capital ratio would be equal across entrepreneurs if more capital would be used among 
more productive entrepreneurs. The second graph shows the distortion in the capital demanded, 
and this distortion increases with the skill level. The distortion of less productive entrepreneurs is 
very low, because their optimal capital demand is lower than for more productive managers. 
These less skilled managers can self-finance all the capital they demand and if they go to the 
financial market, they are going to borrow and small amount (compared with more productive 
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managers) due to the fact that the outside financing increases with managerial ability. So, more 
productive entrepreneurs operate at a suboptimal scale, meanwhile less productive 
entrepreneurs produce at an optimal scale, being a misallocation of the capital. Finally, the last 
graph shows how the distortion in the output is higher for the most skilled managers. 
Consequently, the lost in the output for these entrepreneurs is very high18. 
 
ASSETS-BASED BORROWING CONSTRAINT 
 
Now we focus in the assets-based borrowing constraint case. Under this framework, all 
firms produce at an optimal level when η ≥ 1. As the value of η decreases, the financial frictions 
suffered by entrepreneur’s increase. Figure 4 shows the quantitative results for a value of η=0.23. 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
18 Interesting to remark that when a firm demands the optimal level of capital, the labor demand 
is also optimal. However, when the level of capital demanded is suboptimal, since labor demand 
depends on the capital level, labor demand is also below the optimal level. 
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These results are very similar to the previous framework. 
 
EARNINGS-BASED BORROWING CONSTRAINT 
 
Finally, we see the results for earnings-based borrowing constraint case. Under this 
framework, all firms produce at an optimal level when η ≥ 0.79. As the value of η decreases, the 
financial frictions suffered by entrepreneurs increase. Figure 5 shows the quantitative results for 
a value of η=0.08. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
As we can observe, Figure 5 reports similar results as in the two previous cases.  
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The misallocation of capital is one of the two distortions at individual level. The second 
distortion is on the occupational choice. When the contractual enforcement decreases (η 
decreases), the equilibrium wage rate decreases, and the opportunity cost of becoming in 
manager decreases. So, more individuals become entrepreneurs. As a consequence, the ability 
threshold decreases and individuals with lower ability become managers. Then, less productive 
technologies need to be activated for labor market to clear. Now, not only we have more 
entrepeneurs with low ability operating, in addition, managers with low ability but high savings 
can borrow more capital and operate at an optimal scale, while managers with high ability but low 
savings cannot acquire enough capital and they operate at a suboptimal scale. Table 5 shows 
the fall in ability threshold and the increasing in the percentage of entrepreneurs due to the 
decrease in the contractual enforcement. 
 
TABLE 5 
η Framework Ability Threshold Entrepreneurs % 
Optimal case The Three scenarios 2.27 8.23 
0.08 Amaral & Quintin 1.818 23.97 
0.23 Assets-based 1.818 23.97 
0.08 Earnings-based 1.818 23.97 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
AGGREGATE LEVEL 
 
 
Once we have presented the effects of the financial frictions at individual level, we start 
showing the consequences at aggregate level, focusing on the effect of the GDP per capita, TFP 
and average size of the plants. Then we conclude our quantitative experiments doing a 
comparison among the different loan type contracts. 
 
TFP, it is obtained from the aggregate production function, 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝜃𝐿𝜇. A corresponds to 
the aggregate productivity, that is TFP is the sum of all particular managerial skill levels. Y is the 
aggregate output, K the aggregate capital and L the aggregate number of workers. Then: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 =
𝑌
𝐾𝜃𝐿𝜇
 
Next tables show the results of our aggregates variables of interest for the three 
frameworks the contractual enforcement increases. We start from a low value of the parameter η 
and we increase until the value at which there are no financial frictions. Values of η not need to 
be the same across the three scenarios. For the same contractual enforcement level, depending 
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on the loan contract the results can be different19. However, for the three scenarios the results 
are exactly the same when for each case the financial frictions are zero. This is because in each 
scenario all the firms are producing at an optimal scale, they are not constrained by the debt limit 
(the debt limit is not binding). 
 
TABLE 6 
 
Amaral & Quintin borrowing constraint 
η 
GDP per 
capita 
Debt/GDP 
ratio 
TFP 
% of 
entrepreneurs 
Plants’ 
average size 
0.27 1.0838 0.0439 1.9636 15.74 11.7050 
0.3 1.1064 0.0482 1.9750 15.74 11.7069 
0.33 1.1269 0.0521 1.9864 15.74 11.7014 
0.4 1.1653 0.0653 2.0052 12.70 14.7428 
0.44 1.1872 0.0709 2.0153 12.70 14.7473 
0.5 1.2115 0.0834 2.0200 10.23 18.5319 
0.55 1.2321 0.0908 2.0273 10.23 18.5342 
0.6 1.2447 0.1024 2.0230 8.23 23.2763 
0.65 1.2591 0.1099 2.0261 8.23 23.2929 
0.7 1.2675 0.1155 2.0270 8.23 23.2796 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 6 shows the aggregate results for Amaral & Quintin borrowing constraint case. 
When the contractual enforcement increases, GDP per capita, TFP, Debt/GDP ratio and plant 
average size increase. Lower financial frictions reduce capital distortions because entrepreneur’s 
debt limit increases. Consequently, more productive managers can manage more capital, 
reducing the distortions they face. This fact increases the aggregate productivity, TFP, which 
contributes to increase GDP. Furthermore, the correlation between the parameter η and the 
Debt/GDP ratio is almost one as in Amaral et al. (2010). Moreover, the percentage of 
entrepreneurs is negatively related to contractual enforcement, which is compatible with the 
results at individual level. Higher the contractual enforcement, higher the ability threshold and 
lower the percentage of entrepreneurs. Managers with more talent hire more workers and 
consequently the average size of establishments increases. 
 
19 The values of η chosen for each case are not the unique equilibria. These values have been 
chosen to illustrate the relationship between η and the variables of interest.  
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TABLE 7  
 
Assets-based borrowing constraint 
η 
GDP per 
capita 
Debt/GDP 
ratio 
TFP 
% of 
entrepreneurs 
Plants’ 
average size 
0.55 1.008 0.042 1.845 19.45 9.278 
0.6 1.027 0.046 1.856 19.45 9.283 
0.63 1.038 0.048 1.864 19.45 9.277 
0.71 1.054 0.058 1.870 15.74 11.703 
0.75 1.074 0.062 1.884 15.74 11.710 
0.8 1.099 0.067 1.903 15.74 11.711 
0.85 1.115 0.076 1.910 12.70 14.743 
0.9 1.149 0.082 1.938 12.70 14.750 
0.95 1.184 0.094 1.962 10.23 18.544 
1 1.267 0.115 2.027 8.23 23.280 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 7 shows the results for the Assets-based scenario. As we can see, the results are 
similar to the previous case. The relationship of contractual enforcement with respect to the 
aggregate variables is positive, except for the percentage of entrepreneurs. We can appreciate 
that the results for η=1 are the same as in the previous scenario when η=0.7, because at those 
values the firms are producing optimally. 
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TABLE 8 
 
Earnings-based borrowing constraint 
η 
GDP per 
capita 
Debt/GDP 
ratio 
TFP 
% of 
entrepreneurs 
Plants’ 
average size 
0.34 1.119 0.050 1.984 15.74 11.709 
0.4 1.148 0.061 2.000 12.70 14.743 
0.44 1.169 0.066 2.009 12.70 14.743 
0.48 1.188 0.071 2.017 12.70 14.739 
0.54 1.208 0.082 2.020 10.23 18.535 
0.59 1.227 0.089 2.026 10.23 18.541 
0.63 1.239 0.094 2.030 10.23 18.538 
0.69 1.251 0.105 2.025 8.23 23.289 
0.74 1.261 0.111 2.026 8.23 23.299 
0.79 1.267 0.115 2.027 8.23 23.280 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Finally, the results for earnings-based case are similar to the two previous scenarios. The 
optimal situation of this case (η=0.79) also gives the same results as the two previous cases. 
 
Next graphs plot the GDP per capita, TFP and plants average size against Debt//GDP 
ratio for each framework. We use Debt/GDP ratio because, for each type of loan contract, this 
empirical measure increases monotonically with contractual enforcement20. The four variables 
are indexed to their respective highest value, that is, for each variable the maximum value is one. 
Furthermore, we fixed a vertical line at a specific value of Debt/GDP ratio in order to emphasize 
the differences across the three scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 From now on we use the Debt/GDP ratio as a proxy variable of the contractual enforcement, as in 
Amaral & Quintin (2010). 
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FIGURE 6 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the GDP per capita when the Debt/GDP ratio increases 
for each of the frameworks. For the three cases, the relationship is positive. Higher the Debt/GDP 
ratio, closer is the GDP per capita to its optimal level. However, we can observe that the distortion 
in GDP per capita is higher under the assets-based borrowing constraint case. When the 
Debt/GDP ratio is 0.58 of its optimal value, GDP per capita under assets-based scenario falls until 
0.87 of the optimal per capita GDP, while for the other two scenarios fall approximately until 0.93. 
As in Li (2016), when earnings are not pledgeable, the borrowing capacity of a firm is proportional 
of its own resources and does not vary with the firm’s productivity. On the other hand, when 
earnings are pledgeable, more productive firms have higher earnings and hence can borrow more 
than less productive firms, even if they all have the same inside funds. Finally, for earnings-based 
and Amaral & Quintin cases the relation between GDP per capita and Debt/GDP ratio is concave, 
meanwhile for assets-based case is linear. 
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FIGURE 7 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between TFP and the Debt/GDP ratio. The results are 
similar to those shown in Figure 6 GDP. Positive relationship in the three scenarios, but in the 
assets-based case the distortion is higher than for the other two scenarios. Furthermore, the 
shape of the curves for each case are the same as in the previous Figure. So, financial frictions 
generate misallocation of the resources that reduce the aggregate productivity, TFP, causing a 
decrease in the per capita GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
FIGURE 8 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the relationship between the plants’ average size and the 
Debt/GDP ratio. We can observe a clear positive relationship, what is consistent with the results 
at individual level. When the Debt/GDP ratio rises, more individuals remain as workers because 
the opportunity cost of become in a manager increases. Consequently, the percentage of 
entrepreneurs decreases (as we have showed Tables 6-8) and the firm’s size increase. Once 
more time, the distortion under assets-based case is the highest. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
We show a clear positive relationship between GDP per capita, TFP, plant average size 
and the financial development for a given type of lending contract. Consequently, we can ensure 
that financial frictions are one of the principal causes of misallocation of resources that affect TFP, 
as in Bah & Fang (2015) and Amaral et al. (2010). Moreover, borrowing constraint based on 
assets distort more compared with borrowing constraints where the earnings are pledgeable. So, 
assets-based borrowing constraint causes an overstatement of the TFP and per capita GDP loss 
due to the financial frictions. Earnings increase with the productivity, so if earnings are pledgeable 
then more productive managers can borrow more from the financial market. 
 
For the same level of Debt/GDP ratio, GDP per capita is lower under the assets-based 
borrowing constraint. Under assets-based borrowing constraint, more productive entrepreneurs 
are more constrained than under the earnings-based case, because they cannot pledge their 
earnings.  So, if there is a decrease in the financial development, the effect of misallocation of 
resources is higher under assets-based scenario, what generates a decrease in the TFP and as 
a consequence, in the GDP per capita. Furthermore, the gain in increasing the financial 
development level (the degree at which loan contracts can be enforced) is different across the 
three frameworks. The gain is more concave under Amaral & Quintin and earnings-based 
borrowing constraints, and more linear under the assets-based borrowing constraint. So, 
increases in the degree at which loan contracts can be enforced are proportionally higher under 
assets-based case. According to Chen & Ma (2019), in the US only 20% of the firms have 
covenants based on assets. This fact suggests that traditional literature, which has considered 
assets-based as the main borrowing constraint, has overstated the effects of financial frictions in 
the aggregate productivity and per capita GDP. However, the access of small firms and less 
developed countries’ firms to earnings-based loans is more difficult. Therefore, to quantify the 
gain in TFP and per capita GDP of increasing the degree at which loan contracts can be enforced 
should take into account the proportion of the different type of loan contracts in the economy. In 
conclusion, we could quantify the effects of different loan contracts, and the results have been 
consistent with the disposable literature. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
FIRMS MAX. PROBLEM 
  
Optimal labor demand in terms of capital. 
max
{𝑙}
𝜋 = 𝑦 − 𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
s.t 𝑦 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇  
max
{𝑙}
𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
 
F.O.C: 
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑙
= 0 → 𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇−1 = 𝑤⁡ 
𝑙∗ = [
𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃
𝑤
]
1
1−𝜇
 
 
(1.1) 
 
 
a) The optimal capital demand when entrepreneurs are unconstrained 
 
max
{𝑘}
𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
 
F.O.C: 
 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑘
= 0 → 𝜃𝑧𝑘𝜃−1𝑙𝜇 = 𝑟 + 𝛿⁡ 
Using optimal labor demand expression (1.1): 
 
𝜃𝑧𝑘𝜃−1 [
𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃
𝑤
]
𝜇
1−𝜇
⁡⁡= 𝑟 + 𝛿⁡ 
 
 
𝑘∗ = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
(2.1) 
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Profits for constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs: 
𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 −𝑤𝑙 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘⁡ → 𝜋 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃 [
𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃
𝑤
]
𝜇
1−𝜇
⁡⁡− 𝑤 [
𝜇𝑧𝑘𝜃
𝑤
]
1
1−𝜇
− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
𝜋 = (1 − 𝜇) [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧𝑘𝜃]
1
1−𝜇
− (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 
 
 
 
 
Replacing optimal capital demand expression (2.1) we obtain profits for unconstrained firms: 
𝜋∗ = (1 − 𝜇 − 𝜃)[(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
Output for constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs is obtained using optimal labor 
demand function (1.1): 
 
𝑦 = 𝑧𝑘𝜃𝑙𝜇 
𝑦 = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧𝑘𝜃]
1
1−𝜇
 
 
 
 
 
Output for unconstrained entrepreneurs can be obtained replacing the optimal level of capital 
(2.1): 
 
𝑦∗ = [(
𝜇
𝑤
)
𝜇
𝑧⁡ (
𝜃
𝑟 + 𝛿
)
1−𝜇
]
1
1−𝜃−𝜇
 
 
ENDOGENOUS DEBT LIMIT 
AMARAL & QUINTIN BORROWING CONSTRAINT 
The incentive-compatibility constraint is given by the following expression: 
𝜋 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ (1 − 𝜂)[𝜋 + (𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟)] 
 
𝜋 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟)
1 − 𝜂
≥ 𝜋 + (𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
 
𝜋 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟)
(1 − 𝜂)(1 + 𝑟)
−
𝜋 + 𝑎
1 + 𝑟
≥ 𝑑 
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Firm’s maximum level of debt would be: 
𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1 − 𝜂)(1 + 𝑟)
[𝜋 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟)] 
 
ASSETS BASED BORROWING CONSTRAINT 
The incentive-compatibility constraint is given by the following expression: 
𝜋 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ 𝜋 + (1 − 𝜂)(𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
Where: 
𝑘 = 𝑎 + 𝑑 
 
𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ (1 − 𝜂)(𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
 
𝑎(1 + 𝑟)
(1 − 𝜂)(1 + 𝑟)
− 𝑎 ≥ 𝑑 
 
Firm’s maximum level of debt would be: 
𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1 − 𝜂)
𝑎 
 
EARNINGS BASED BORROWING CONSTRAINT 
The incentive-compatibility constraint is given by the following expression: 
𝜋𝑛 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ [(1 − 𝜂)𝜋𝑛 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] + (𝑎 + 𝑑)(1 + 𝑟) 
 
𝜋𝑛 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) ≥ 𝜋𝑛 − 𝜂𝜋𝑛 − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 + 𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) 
 
𝜂𝜋𝑛 ≥ 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) 
 
Firm’s maximum level of debt would be: 
𝑑 ≤
𝜂
(1 − 𝑟)
𝜋𝑛 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
In order to check that our results correspond to the steady-state equilibrium values, we 
prove not only that the labour market clears, but also that there is equilibrium in the goods market. 
That is, aggregate GDP must equal aggregate demand. Aggregate GDP is given by: 
Ys = Y + (r + δ)Storage. 
On the other hand, the aggregate demand: 
Yd = C1+C2+δS 
Where S is aggregate savings, and C1 and C2 are aggregate consumptions in period 1 and period 
2, respectively. Finally, we build GDP per capita as GDP/2, because the population in each period 
is equal two and the grow rate of population is zero. 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
Managers select the solution where their own investment a is the highest, and if they can 
self-finance all their capital they do so, even though they could choose to borrow some of it. This 
is because the marginal product of capital exceeds its opportunity cost (1+r) in establishments 
operated at a suboptimal scale. When we solve firm’s profit maximization problem, we obtain that 
marginal product of the capital equals to its price. 
𝑀𝑃𝐾 = 𝑟 + 𝛿 
However, when the firm is operated at a suboptimal scale: 
𝑘∗ > 𝑘 
Where 𝑘∗ is the optimal capital and k the level of capital demanded by the firm when is operating 
at a suboptimal scale. Then: 
𝑀𝑃𝐾∗ < 𝑀𝑃𝐾 
Taking into account that: 
𝑀𝑃𝐾∗ = 𝑟 + 𝛿 
Then: 
𝑀𝑃𝐾 > 𝑟 + 𝛿 
So, entrepreneurs will invest all their savings in physical capital because the net return of doing 
this is higher than the net return to invest in the Storage technology, which is 1+r. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
WORKERS MAX. PROBLEM 
max
{𝑐1⁡𝑐2}
𝑈 = log 𝑐1 + 𝛽 log 𝑐2 
s.t {
𝑐1 = 𝑤 − 𝑎
𝑐2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 +𝑤
𝑎 ≥ 0
 
 
max
{𝑎≥0}
𝑈 = log(w − a) + 𝛽 log(𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑤) 
 
Lagrange function: 
£ = log(w − a) + 𝛽 log(𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑤) + 𝜆(𝑎 − 0)⁡ 
 
Kuhn-Tucker F.O.C: 
 
𝜕£
𝜕𝑎
= 0 →⁡−
1
𝑐1
+
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
+ 𝜆 = 0 
 
 
 
 
𝜆(𝑎 − 0) = 0 and 𝜆 ≥ 0 
 
 
 
 
1. Interior solution: 
 
𝜆 = 0⁡ → 𝑎 ≥ 0, and from (5) we have the Euler’s equation: 
𝑐2 = 𝛽(1 + 𝑟)𝑐1 
 
Then the optimal solutions are given by: 
𝑎𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤(𝛽(1 + 𝑟) − 1)
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐1
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤(2 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
⁡⁡ 
 
 
 
 
𝑐2
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑤𝛽(2 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
 
 
 
2. Corner solution: 
 
𝜆 ≥ 0⁡ → 𝑎 = 0, and from (5) we have: 
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𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
+ 𝜆 =
1
𝑐1
⁡→ 𝜆 ≥ 0 →
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
≤
1
𝑐1
→ 𝑐2 ≥ 𝛽(1 + 𝑟)𝑐1 
 
𝑎𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 0; 𝑐1
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝑤;𝑐2
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝑤 
 
 
ENTREPENEURS MAX. PROBLEM 
 
max
{𝑐1⁡𝑐2}
𝑈 = log 𝑐1 + 𝛽 log 𝑐2 
s.t {
𝑐1 = 𝑤 − 𝑎
𝑐2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎 + 𝜋
𝑎 ≥ 0
 
 
max
{𝑎≥0}
𝑈 = log(w − a) + 𝛽 log(𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋) 
£ = log(w − a) + 𝛽 log(𝑎(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋) + 𝜆(𝑎 − 0) 
 
F.O.C: 
𝜕£
𝜕𝑎
= 0 →⁡−
1
𝑐1
+
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
+ 𝜆 = 0 
 
 
 
 
𝜆(𝑎 − 0) = 0 and 𝜆 ≥ 0 
 
 
 
 
1. Interior solution: 
 
𝜆 = 0⁡ → 𝑎 ≥ 0, and from (10) we have the Euler’s equation: 
𝑐2 = 𝛽(1 + 𝑟)𝑐1 
 
Then the optimal solutions are given by: 
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠 ⁡=
𝑤𝛽(1 + 𝑟) − 𝜋
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
 
 
 
 
 
𝑐1
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
=
𝑤(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋
(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝛽)
⁡⁡ 
 
 
 
 
𝑐2
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
=
𝛽(𝑤(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝛽)
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2. Corner solution: 
 
𝜆 ≥ 0⁡ → 𝑎 = 0, and from (5) we have: 
 
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
+ 𝜆 =
1
𝑐1
⁡→ 𝜆 ≥ 0 →
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)
𝑐2
≤
1
𝑐1
→ 𝑐2 ≥ 𝛽(1 + 𝑟)𝑐1 
 
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠 = 0; 𝑐1
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
= 𝑤; 𝑐2
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑠
= 𝜋 
 
